Political Competition and Public Procurement Outcomes.
Broms, Rasmus, Dahlström, Carl, & Fazekas, Mihály
Comparative Political Studies, 52(9). 2019
Years: 2019
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26.
Fazekas, Mihály, and King, Peter Lawrence
Regulation & Governance, 13(3). 2019
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96.
Single bidding and non-competitive tendering procedures in EU Co-funded Projects.
Fazekas, Mihály
European Commission, Brussels. 2019
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97.
Analytics for Integrity. Data-Driven Approaches for Enhancing Corruption and Fraud Risk Assessments.
Fazekas, Mihály, Ugale, Gavin, and Zhao, Angelina
OECD, Paris. 2019
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98.
Fazekas, Mihály and Maslova, Natalya
Council of Europe, Strasbourg. [in Russian]. 2019
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144.
Elections and corruption: incentives to steal or incentives to invest?
Fazekas, Mihály & Hellmann, Olli
GTI-WP/2019:02, Budapest: Government Transparency Institute. 2019
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145.
Agency Design, Favoritism and Procurement in the United States.
Dahlström, Carl; Fazekas, Mihály; & Lewis, David E
QoG Working Paper Series 2019:4, Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg. 2019
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146.
Strategic Sourcing 20: Improving Fiscal Efficiency Using Big Data.
De Oliveira, Alexandre; Fabregas, Abdoulaye; & Fazekas, Mihaly
Conference paper: ”Public Procurement: Global Revolution IX” at the University of Nottingham, June 2019. 2019
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147.
Auction Length and Prices: Evidence from Random Auction Closing in Brazil.
De Oliveira, Alexandre; Fabregas, Abdoulaye; & Fazekas, Mihaly
Policy Research Working Paper; no. WPS 8828. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 2019